Hypocrisy & Nuclear Lobby

Discussion in 'General Discussion' started by M1ch@el, Jul 23, 2022.

  1. M1ch@el Member

    The Rosatom Exemption: How Russia's State-Run Nuclear Giant Has Escaped Sanctions
    June 15, 2022 09:14 GMT
    The cooling towers of the Temelin nuclear power plant in the Czech Republic. (file photo)

    Europe has grappled with how to end its Russian energy addiction more than ever since Vladimir Putin launched his country's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine on February 24.
    The executive body of the 27-nation European Union agreed a plan in May to reduce its dependence on Russian natural gas by two-thirds by the end of the year, with a total phaseout of all Russian fossil fuel planned by the end of 2027. Coal, already on the outs in much of the bloc, will be banned by August.
    But absent from sanctions, let alone discussion, is Rosatom, the Russian state-run nuclear power giant, despite a written appeal in the early days of the invasion from Ukrainian activists and NGOs to blacklist the company and ban nuclear fuel imported from Russia.

    Brussels is not alone. When U.S. President Joe Biden announced a U.S. ban on Russian oil, natural gas, and coal imports in March, there was no mention of Rosatom. The Biden administration reportedly considered sanctioning Rosatom but backed off after nuclear industry lobbying and Biden's plans to include nuclear power as part of the transition to clean energy, Reuters reported.

    Operators work at the control hall in block three of Bulgaria's only nuclear power plant in Kozloduy.
    Rosatom's footprint is deep in the global reactor and nuclear fuel business. That type of economic sway may explain why Russia's nuclear industry "has managed to stay out of the limelight" during talk of sanctions, explained Oksana Ananyeva, an energy-policy analyst at the Ukrainian NGO Ekodia, one of the signatories of the March appeal addressed to Biden and EU leaders.
    "One of the reasons for that is certainly the heavy reliance on uranium and nuclear fuel as most of the 32 countries that use nuclear power rely on Russia for some part of their nuclear fuel supply chain," Ananyeva told RFE/RL.

    The Numbers

    Russian nuclear power radiates far beyond its borders. Of the 439 nuclear reactors in operation around the world in 2021, 38 of them were in Russia, an additional 42 were made with Russian nuclear reactor technology, and 15 more under construction were being built with Russian technology, according to a study published on May 23 at Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy.
    Russia is also a source of uranium, the key ingredient in nuclear fuel. Europe gets some 20 percent of its uranium from Russia. The United States relies on Russia for 16 percent of its uranium, with another 30 percent from two of Moscow's close partners, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
    Russia owned 40 percent of the total uranium conversion infrastructure in the world in 2020 and 46 percent of the total uranium enrichment capacity in the world in 2018, according to the Columbia University report.

    An EU Rethink On Nuclear Power?

    In recent years, Rosatom is reported to have been part of nuclear-power industry lobby efforts to convince the EU to embrace nuclear as the bloc considers how to move faster to cleaner forms of power. According to Greenpeace, new EU nuclear capacity could be worth an estimated 500 billion euros ($521 billion) of potential investment.

    The EU is scrambling to meet a goal of net-zero emissions by 2050 to prevent catastrophic global warming. Part of that process is defining what is and what isn't a climate-friendly investment. Leaders in Brussels are seeking approval from EU countries and the European Parliament to include nuclear energy as a sustainable investment in its "taxonomy" policy for labeling green investments.

    Greenpeace activists protest in front of the Rosatom headquarters in Moscow.
    Rosatom has been accused by Greenpeace of using lobbying connections, which the environmental NGO describes as "reminiscent of nesting Russian dolls," to press for the inclusion of nuclear energy in the taxonomy of sustainable investments, much like Russian energy firms Gazprom and LUKoil have done to include fossil gas.

    In a report released on May 17, Greenpeace said its research had uncovered that Russian energy companies, including Gazprom, had met with EU commissioners and senior officials either directly or through subsidiaries and lobby groups at least 18 times since the European Commission published its action plan on sustainable finance in March 2018.

    Beyond fuel, Rosatom is hoping to build new nuclear reactors, which are the core of its business. Hungary, heavily dependent on Russian gas and oil, has voiced opposition to proposed EU bans on Russian energy. It also has plans with Rosatom to build new reactors at its Paks nuclear power plant.
    After meeting Rosatom's chief executive in Istanbul on May 5, Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto said in a statement that the planned construction of the two new blocks at Paks served Hungary's strategic interests.

    Szijjarto said the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority was reviewing the requests for permits submitted by Rosatom and once these are approved the project could enter its next phase.
    The project, awarded in 2014 without a tender to Rosatom but plagued by delays, has often been cited as a sign of warm ties between Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Putin.

    While Hungary appears to be going ahead, Finland has announced it is pulling out from its planned reactor project with Rosatom. On May 2, the Finnish-led consortium Fennovoima said it had scrapped a contract with Rosatom citing delays and increased risks due to the war in Ukraine.
    Rosatom, which owns a 34 percent stake in the consortium through a Finnish subsidiary, said on May 6 that it will demand compensation for the "unlawful termination" of the contract.

    Europe's Dependence

    Russia's invasion of Ukraine has also eroded some of the cooperation deals Rosatom has with other nuclear giants.

    The German multinational Siemens recently told the country's Tageszeitung newspaper that it condemns Russia's invasion of Ukraine and had halted "all new business" within Russia but would honor already-commissioned nuclear projects with Rosatom.

    An operator of the third reactor at Bulgaria's Kozloduy nuclear power plant checks the terminals in the reactor's control center.
    RFE/RL reached out unsuccessfully to Siemens for comment.
    The French nuclear conglomerate Framatome has so far refused to end its cooperation with Rosatom. In December 2021, Rosatom and Framatome announced the signing of a "strategic cooperation" agreement to expand efforts to develop nuclear fuel and technologies.

    And while more than 1,000 Western firms have either suspended or ended operations in Russia due to Putin's invasion of Ukraine, Framatome doesn't appear ready to join them.

    "The agreement announced last December is still in place, but Framatome is carefully monitoring the situation in Russia and the evolution of the sanctions," said Sharon Sinclair, a spokeswoman for Framatome, in an e-mail response to RFE/RL.

    Rosatom's position in the European nuclear market, at least, is routinely overstated, argued the leading European nuclear industry lobbying group.
    People stage a protest against the Belgian Tihange nuclear power station.
    "According to the Euratom Supply Agency, 18 power plants out of the 103 in the EU, representing around 10 percent of EU gross nuclear electricity capacity, are dependent on supply of Russian fuel," said Nucleareurope in a statement to RFE/RL.

    "These concern some operators in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia and one operator (out of two) in Finland. To be more specific, this fuel is for the Russian VVER-440s and VVER-1000s reactor technology, which exist in many of these countries as part of a shared history with the former Soviet Union," Nucleareurope noted.

    Washington has pledged to help the Czech Republic diversify fuel for its six Russian-designed reactors. U.S.-based Westinghouse and Framatome are due to start supplying nuclear fuel to the Temelin nuclear power plant in 2024, CEZ, the majority Czech state-owned utility, announced in April.

    Westinghouse has signed a deal with Ukraine to supply fuel to all four of its nuclear power plants, reports said earlier this month.
    The Paks nuclear power plant in Hungary.
    The agreement also increases the planned number of new nuclear reactors Westinghouse could build in Ukraine to nine from an earlier five, and the company has pledged to establish an engineering center in the country.

    In 2021, Westinghouse signed a fuel-licensing agreement with Bulgaria's Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant in what was described as a major step forward in Bulgaria's energy supply diversification.

    Slowly but surely, the share of nuclear fuel in Europe is dropping, noted Ananyeva in e-mailed remarks to RFE/RL.

    "Out of 13 EU countries that operate nuclear power plants, only three -- Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Hungary -- are using solely Russian fuel for all their nuclear power production," energy policy analyst Ananyeva explained.

    "Two other countries -- Finland and Czechia -- successfully diversified fuel supplies by using fuel produced by Westinghouse, so Ukraine is not the only country leading by example in this case."

  2. M1ch@el Member

    Five reasons that Russia’s nuclear exports will continue, despite sanctions and the Ukraine invasion. But for how long?

    By Marina Lorenzini, Francesca Giovannini | May 17, 2022

    [IMG] Russian President Vladimir Putin participates via video link in a ceremony to launch the construction of a third reactor of the Turkish nuclear power plant built by Russia's energy giant Rosatom, in Moscow on March 10, 2021. (Photo by ALEXEY DRUZHININ/SPUTNIK/AFP via Getty Images)

    By many measures, Russia’s state-controlled nuclear energy company, Rosatom, has primacy in the global nuclear energy market. At any given moment, the firm provides technical expertise, enriched fuel, and equipment to nuclear reactors around the world. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and, more acutely, the Russian military’s dangerous actions at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and in the Chernobyl exclusion zone have many countries rethinking their dependence on Russian nuclear products and searching for alternatives. Additionally, the ensuing global effort to cripple Russian access to international markets calls into question the viability of current contracts, government licensing, and financial instruments involved in Russia’s nuclear exports.

    Concurrently, the invasion has highlighted the lack of energy source diversification across Europe. Headlines have focused on how several European countries decided to phase out or delay plans to build new nuclear power plants in the wake of the 2011 Fukushima-Daiichi disaster and, instead, increase imports of Russian oil and natural gas to feed their electric grids’ baseload needs. Now, in response to the sudden European effort to minimize dependence on Russian imports, the United States has sent tankers of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to European ports.

    Additionally, the United States and partners are releasing a round of oil from their strategic stockpiles to stabilize market prices. For oil and natural gas supplies to Europe, there are some immediate alternatives available. However, for nuclear power plants, swapping in alternative supplies is causing serious dilemmas and could lead to stranded assets.

    Disdain for Russia’s actions in Ukraine and current sanctions related to the invasion will ultimately exact costs from the Russian nuclear industry, but Russia’s dominance in the nuclear energy market will likely endure in the short term for five main reasons.

    US and EU reluctance to apply sanctions specifically to the Russian nuclear energy sector. Current US sanctions heavily target Russia, but they are not broad, geography-based designations, like the sanctioning approaches to Iran and North Korea, which target all persons and entities connected to those countries. Without a geography-based designation, various legal authorities currently form a patchwork of sanctions that target Russia in some way—but also, in practice, allow some forms of trade to occur, namely in the energy sector.

    Despite the Biden administration’s initial signals, Rosatom has yet to be sanctioned explicitly. On March 8, President Biden issued an executive order focused on inhibiting investment in the Russian energy sector. While one section of the order (“new investment in the energy sector in the Russian Federation by a United States person”) may arguably include the nuclear energy industry, the Biden administration has not yet specifically targeted Russia’s mineral, fuel, or equipment exports in the United States and around the world related to nuclear power plants. Plus, the long-term contracts currently in place are not in immediate jeopardy since the executive order focuses on “new investment.”

    The European Union has demonstrated similar patterns. Politico reported at the end of April that five EU diplomats disclosed that the EU is mulling placing sanctions on uranium imports from Russia. This follows a call on April 7 from members of the EU Parliament for additional punitive measures, including “an immediate full embargo on Russian imports of oil, coal, nuclear fuel, and gas.” The call more explicitly mentions nuclear and would impact current and future contracts, if enacted in its current form. That being said, no such action has yet taken place.

    US and EU reliance on Russian fuel. Upon further examination of nuclear fuel supplies, the hesitation to enact an embargo becomes clear. According to the US Trade Commission, in 2019 Russia was the 20th-largest supplier of imported goods to the United States. But, the most valuable set of imported goods, sitting at a $13 billion valuation, was mineral fuels, including uranium and enriched nuclear fuel. In 2020, imports of Russian uranium accounted for 16 percent of uranium purchases for US nuclear power plants, according to the Energy Information Administration. This is just one example of how the United States’ nuclear energy industry is greatly intertwined with Russian products.

    During her confirmation hearing, a senior adviser in the US Energy Department, Kathryn Huff, told the Senate’s Energy and Natural Resources Committee that “[w]e need to build out capacity for a Western alternative for the Russian component of the uranium market, including conversion and enrichment capacity. There is no question in my mind that we will continue to focus on uranium as an incredibly important fuel.”

    While the Energy Department may have the desire to wean US nuclear power from Russian supplies, immediate cost-effective and quick alternatives are not available on the market. Replacing Russia’s uranium and related nuclear fuel services alone would require government spending of $1 billion or more, Huff stated. Europe faces a similar quandary. The EU imports almost all its uranium from outside the bloc. And, about 20 percent comes from Russia, making the country the second-largest supplier to the EU after Niger.

    As of this writing, the price of uranium sat at close to $50 per pound and peaked at $65 in mid-April, a significant jump from around $26 per pound in August 2021. Increasing the scarcity of uranium supply by sanctioning such products could lead to a further shock to electric grids at a moment when prices of other sources of energy are also recalibrating due to market volatility.

    In addition to legacy fuel sources, advanced reactor demonstrations expected to come online around 2028 require high-assay, low-enriched uranium (HALEU), which is enriched to contain a higher percentage of the fissile uranium 235 isotope than commercial nuclear power reactors now use. Russia is currently the singular viable commercial supplier globally of HALEU, and other firms look to be years away from readily providing such fuel. It wasn’t until 2021 that Centrus Energy Corporation became the only licensed HALEU production facility in the United States. The Department of Energy has announced that the company is on track to produce fuel by this summer.

    To address the nuclear fuel situation, on April 7, US senators Joe Manchin and Jim Risch introduced the International Nuclear Energy Act of 2022. Among other goals, the bill aims to create a Nuclear Fuels Security Initiative that would reduce and eventually eliminate reliance on Chinese and Russian nuclear fuel. If this bill passes, then the US domestic nuclear industry may be better positioned to absorb the consequences of a ban on Russian nuclear products and, in turn, also act as a global supplier. But even if passed and signed into law, this initiative may take several years to be realized.

    Most destination countries continue to import nuclear products from Russia. Except for a few circumstances, most countries and companies are continuing their contracts with Russian nuclear companies, whether they are facing public pressure to decouple themselves from the Russian economy or not. These contracts involve many aspects of nuclear power plant construction, operation, and maintenance.

    Fuel delivery. For instance, Sweden’s nuclear energy company Vattenfall AB, announced on February 24 that it would not place new orders with Russian companies for nuclear fuel until further notice. In the announcement, the President and CEO Anna Borg noted that the firm has secured alternative deliveries of nuclear fuel. Vattenfall sources its uranium supplies from Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan, and Namibia. So, the decision to not place new orders with Russian companies did not create a significant disruption for procurement of fuel.

    Government licensing and project finance. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Finnish officials have questioned the viability of the planned construction of the Hanhikivi nuclear power plant. The dispute hinged on whether the government would grant a construction permit. A Finnish-Russian consortium (called Fennovoima) commissioned the plant, in which Finnish stakeholders such as Outokumpu, Fortum, and SSAB own two thirds, with Rosatom’s subsidiary RAOS Voima holding the remainder. Fennovoima had expected to obtain a construction license from the government by this summer to build the 1.2-gigawatt (GW) reactor, while construction was expected to begin in 2023. In a statement, Rosatom and RAOS Project stated that they would continue to fulfill their obligations from signed agreements and contracts relating to the Hanhikivi I project. On May 2, Fennovoima terminated the existing contract with RAOS, demonstrating a willingness to absorb financial costs. However, such costs were rather minimal in comparison to the consequences that could have been incurred if the plant were already operating.
    Other countries and/or companies may not be in the position to accept the costs of quickly pivoting away from Russian provisions. In fact, even NATO members like Slovakia, Hungary, and Turkey are continuing their operations with Rosatom. These countries house Russian-made nuclear reactors, for which there is no authorized nuclear fuel alternative to the Russian supply, and terminating a partnership with Rosatom could mean temporarily halting operations at the facility.

    Mining and fuel delivery. While Slovakia has said that it has enough nuclear fuel to last through the end of 2023, a ban on Russian imports would be an impending challenge. “This is very concerning as we are 100 percent dependent on Russian nuclear fuel deliveries from the company TVEL,” said Karol Galek, Slovakia’s state secretary for energy in the Ministry of Finance. Slovakia has notable uranium deposits in east of the country. But when Canada’s Tournigan Energy showed interest in investing in mining uranium, citizens strongly protested in 2006 and again in 2013. According to amendments in 2010 to Slovakia’s Geological Act, citizens of nearby villages can reject an application for uranium exploration. Plus, even if citizens agreed or the government were to further amend the law, it could take several years to start mining operations.

    Fuel delivery, loan disbursement, and facility expansion. In Hungary, the challenge goes beyond the fuel itself. Even after opposition parties called for Prime Minister Viktor Orbán to cancel a roughly 12.5 billion euro ($13.84 billion) deal with Rosatom, Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto announced on March 2 that no such action would take place. The deal is set to build another two reactors at the Paks plant to replace the capacity of the current units. The two current reactors are set to be shut down between 2032 and 2037. The existing 2-gigawatt plant, consisting of two Russian-made VVER reactors, accounts for about half of Hungary’s electricity generation and was largely financed by a Russian state loan. In fact, even in the thick of the Ukraine war, on April 7, Hungary received the first shipment of nuclear fuel for Paks nuclear plant from Russia.

    In Hungary, not only is Paks reliant on Russian nuclear fuel, but the country also already has contracts in place to expand the facility and finance the project with Russia. This circumstance brings to the fore another traditional strength of the Russian nuclear industry: state-backed financing. For years, Russian companies have out-maneuvered competitors and secured lucrative deals due to their state-backed financing offerings. Many other companies—including Framatome, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Siemens, and Westinghouse—typically require robust financial guarantees, partnership arrangements, and power purchase agreements to satisfy their own corporate business standards. Not only is the Paks plant already fit to comply with Russian products, but no other nuclear company or state is likely willing to match the Russian offer.

    Russia offers extensive and generous financing structures. In ways not fully realized in Hungary yet, the Akkuyu nuclear power plant in Turkey demonstrates the aggressive financing capacities embedded within the Russian nuclear export strategy. Unlike in Finland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the United States, Turkey’s partnership with Russia involves the ongoing construction of an estimated $22 billion nuclear power plant. (Rosatom would build four VVER-1200 generation 3+ reactors, producing 1.2 gigawatts each.) This plant is set to provide 10 percent of Turkey’s annual electricity needs, with the first reactor undergoing installation and scheduled to be online in 2023, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Turkey, with the other three units to follow by 2026. Even with the ongoing war in Ukraine, on March 16 Rosatom delivered the main components of a turbine plant, including a stator, turbine generator rotor, and low-pressure cylinder. With such a lucrative and symbolic deal in process, Turkey is unlikely to pull the plug.

    The Akkuyu plant was made possible by an innovative Russian creation previously unseen in the nuclear industry: the build-own-operate investment model. After decades of unfruitful efforts to attract foreign nuclear power companies to build Turkey’s nuclear energy infrastructure, the Turkish government took a new approach in May 2010—direct talks between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey that led to an intergovernmental agreement within the same year.

    The “build” step of the model is made possible by the Russian-established project company in Turkey called the Akkuyu Nuclear Joint-Stock Company, with stakeholders consisting of Russian companies: Rosatom Energy International JSC (74.915 percent), Rosenergoatom JSC (21.948 percent), Atomstroyexport CJSC (2.267 percent), Inter RAO UES JSC (.820 percent), Atomtechenergo JSC (.025 percent), and Atomenergoremont JSC (.025 percent). Through the stakeholders, Russian banks provide loans to the Akkuyu Nuclear Joint-Stock Company. And some of the banks haven’t fared so well under the current U.S. sanctions regime.

    To name a few: In 2021, Sberbank announced it would provide a loan of $800 million for a period of seven years to construct the four units at the Akkuyu plant. On February 24, the Biden administration placed sanctions on Sberbank, Russia’s largest state-owned bank, which holds a third of all bank assets in Russia. In early May, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that the EU will move to cut Sberbank from the SWIFT international payments system.

    Sovcombank has also been involved in Rosatom’s construction of Turkey’s Akkuyu plant, announcing $300 million in loans in March 2021. A year later, the company and executives were put on the sanctions list administered by the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control. Also, as of March 12, Sovcombank will no longer have access to the Belgium-based SWIFT financial messaging service. Undoubtedly, sanctions will impact the overall financial health of the banks and their ability to continue operations as before.

    But it remains unclear, based on information in the public press, how the banks have adapted to the current sanctions. Will they be able to fulfill the announced loans in full? What actions are the countries and companies involved taking to shield themselves from potential exposure to the US sanctions regime? Will companies or countries seek a sanctions waiver from the United States or EU to continue this specific kind of cooperation? Beyond those questions, it also remains unclear to what extent the Biden administration or the EU will prioritize pursuit of sanctions violations on Slovakia, Hungary, or Turkey for their current cooperation with Russian nuclear entities and associated financing vehicles. Only time will tell how sanctions will directly or indirectly impact the banks’ ability to deliver on the project finance agreements.

    In the event of a halt to construction at the Akkuyu site, whether due to bankruptcy or an import embargo, Turkey would inherit a serious stranded asset problem.

    No other supplier is prepared to quickly operate a Russian facility. To date, India has not imposed any sanctions against Russia. Nonetheless, there is great debate on the extent to which secondary sanctions could affect India. India hosts two Rosatom-built reactors (Kudankulam 1 and 2) that are connected to the electric grid and a desalination plant. Rosatom provides the enriched fuel for this site, and construction is underway for an additional four reactors on the site. If the connection to Rosatom were to be severed, who would supply spare parts for the two operating reactors, which up to now came from Rosatom? Will operation of those two plants cease, at least for a while? And how would work on the four new reactors go forward? If ties with Rosatom were to be cut, the Indian reactors could well become stranded assets. Iran’s Bushehr reactor provides a historic example of just how costly such orphaned nuclear facilities can become.

    In 1975, West Germany’s Kraftwerk Union AG signed contracts to build a ‘turnkey’ nuclear power plant and deliver nuclear fuel for the reactor units at Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant. But in 1979, construction was interrupted by the fall of the Shah and the Islamic Revolution. Such political conditions, followed by the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), dissuaded Kraftwerk Union from continuing operations. It wasn’t until 1995 that Iran could solidify a renewed effort on the reactors, via a contract for approximately $800 million with the Russian Federation Ministry for Atomic Energy (Minatom) to complete Bushehr’s Unit 1, a Russian VVER pressurized water reactor. Because of a variety of difficulties in meshing the work done under the German contract with the Russian reactor, the first Bushehr unit didn’t reach 100 percent power generation capacity until August 2012—37 years after the original contracts were signed.
    The Bushehr site suggests just some of the difficulties that any number of Russian built, operated, or supplied reactors could face, if sanctions were to force plants to cut ties with Rosatom and/or Russian financing vehicles. The facilities could then also become stranded assets, a source of millions of dollars in lost revenues, to say nothing of the secondary impacts related to the delay in provision of electricity to surrounding populations. Given those impacts, it is likely that most countries with Russian reactors will continue working with Rosatom in the near term, and perhaps longer.

    Will Rosatom be able to reach new nuclear agreements? In the short term, the Russians will likely retain most of their nuclear-related commercial agreements and remain a strong player in the global nuclear market. Finland and Sweden seem to be outliers in the field. Still, the political pressure is mounting, and countries may put forth the necessary investments in the coming years to disentangle themselves from Russian provisions. Future long-term contracts with Russian entities may no longer be seen as vital.

    Given the political environment and potential loss of revenue streams, Russia has attempted to flex its muscles. To bolster its own currency, it is possible that Russia could sway countries to develop mechanisms to pay in rubles, as we have seen in the oil and natural gas market. Plus, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak announced that Moscow is considering banning exports of Russia uranium to the United States in retaliation for sanctions. Would Moscow do the same for the EU bloc or any country speaking out against Russian atrocities in Ukraine?

    Nonetheless, if Russia cannot continue to fulfill generous loans as sanctions shrink Russian reserves, Rosatom’s immense strategic commercial advantage over competitors—France’s Framatome and Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, among others—could be diminished. In this event, other companies may be able to make a stronger case for their products and gain market share in the global nuclear energy industry.
  3. M1ch@el Member

    View attachment The_Obama_Surge_in_Afghanistan_by_Latuff2_thumb[2]

    Please Hackers don't be dumb don't become cyberwarriors !

    Don't forget wars [and pandemics] enrich only oligarchic interests specially american ones !

    Don't let yourself be manipulated by oligarchic interests and uncle Sam or by capitalist profiteers who just wish to sell you courses and books !

    Attached Files:

  4. M1ch@el Member


  5. les soldats russes en stationnement a tchernobyl ..sont retournés chez eux ...ils etaient nauseaux et fluorecents la nuit..leurs parents esperent toucher un jour la prime pour s'acheter une lada
  6. російські солдати, дислоковані в Чорнобилі..повернулися до своїх домівок...їх нудило і вони світилися вночі..їх батьки сподіваються одного дня отримати премію, щоб купити нову машину
  7. російські солдати, дислоковані в Чорнобилі..повернулися до своїх домівок...їх нудило і вони світилися вночі..їх батьки сподіваються одного дня отримати премію, щоб купити нову машину
  8. M1ch@el Member

    Guerre en Ukraine : la centrale nucléaire de Zaporijjia de nouveau bombardée

    Le site de la plus grande centrale nucléaire d'Europe a de nouveau été pris pour cible dans la nuit de samedi à dimanche. Russes et Ukrainiens se renvoient la responsabilité. Le secrétaire général de l'ONU a qualifié, ce lundi, cette attaque de « suicidaire ».

    C'est l'un des sites les plus sensibles de la guerre menée par la Russie en Ukraine. Le site de la centrale nucléaire ukrainienne de Zaporijjia, la plus grande d'Europe, a été bombardé dans la nuit de samedi à dimanche. Vendredi, des bombardements avaient déjà touché ces installations du sud de l'Ukraine, passées sous contrôle russe fin mars.
    Les autorités d'occupation de la ville d'Energodar, où se trouve la centrale de Zaporijjia , ont affirmé que c'est l'armée ukrainienne qui a tiré un engin à sous-munitions avec un « lance-roquettes multiple Ouragan ». Précisant : « Les éclats et le moteur de la roquette sont tombés à 400 mètres d'un réacteur en marche. » Cette frappe a « endommagé » des bâtiments administratifs et touché « une zone de stockage de combustible nucléaire usagé », ont-elles également ajouté.

    Accusations réciproques

    Parallèlement, la compagnie d'Etat ukrainienne EnergoAtom a annoncé qu'un des employés sur place avait dû être hospitalisé pour des « blessures causées par l'explosion » d'une des roquettes tirées « samedi soir » par les Russes. « Trois détecteurs de surveillance des radiations autour du site de la centrale ont été endommagés (...). Par conséquent, il est actuellement impossible de détecter » une éventuelle hausse de la radioactivité et donc d'« intervenir en temps utile », a-t-elle regretté.

  9. et ca continue ;;; de nombreux soldats russes qui etaient en poste a tchernobyl sont rentrés au pays vivants .. mais malades sources a venir bientot merci ANONYMOUS AZERBADJAN officiers tués en ukraine.png
  10. [COLOR=var(--neutral-foreground-rest)] radiations

    [COLOR=var(--neutral-foreground-rest)]Thomas Burgel - 1 avr.[/COLOR]


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    © Des troupes ukrainiennes en manœuvre autour de Tchernobyl, quelques jours seulement avant l'invasion russe. | Sergei SUPINSKY / AFPDes troupes ukrainiennes en manœuvre autour de Tchernobyl, quelques jours seulement avant l'invasion russe. | Sergei SUPINSKY / AFP
    Le 31 mars, après plus d'un mois d'une occupation doublée d'une terrible prise en otage du personnel sur place, l'Ukraine annonçait qu'une partie des forces russes présentes dans les environs de la tristement célèbre ex-centrale atomique Tchernobyl avaient quitté les lieux.
    Après avoir annoncé sur Telegram le départ de deux colonnes ennemies, Energatom, opérateur nucléaire ukrainien, montrait même que les militaires russes leur avaient officiellement transféré le contrôle de ce qu'il reste de l'usine, un peu plus malmenée encore par un assaut mené sans précaution.



    Ukraine’s state-owned nuclear energy corporation Energoatom have said that Russian forces have transfered control of #Chernobyl back to Ukrainian staff, signing an 'act of transfer' More here - #Russia #UkraineWar #UkraineRussiaWar
    — OvertDefense (@OvertDefense) March 31, 2022
    La manœuvre de retrait traduit-elle en actes les promesses de Moscou de retrait du nord du pays, notamment de la région de Kiev, avec pour objectif de détendre quelque peu les discussions diplomatiques en cours à Istanbul entre l'agresseur et l'occupé –ou pour se concentrer plus à l'est, sur le Donbass?
    À lire aussiÀ Tchernobyl, l'enfer des 200 otages qui travaillent sous la menace des fusils russes
    Peut-être pas. Les troupes russes auraient également été poussées à quitter précipitamment les lieux parce que certains de leurs soldats souffriraient des premiers symptômes d'une irradiation aiguë, selon Energatom.
    «Il faut également noter que l'information à propos de fortifications et de tranchées creusées par les racistes [sic] directement dans la Forêt Rousse, la partie la plus polluée de l'ensemble de la Zone d'exclusion, a été confirmée», écrit Energatom dans son communiqué, sans fard ni retenue, tel que traduit par Motherboard.
    «Il n'est donc pas étonnant que les occupants aient reçu une dose significative de radiations et qu'ils aient paniqué dès les premiers signes de maladie, poursuit le texte. Et cela s'est manifesté très rapidement. Cela a a eu pour résultat un début d'émeute au sein des militaires, et ils ont commencé à partir à ce moment-là.»
    Creuser sa propre tombe

    Selon le Guardian, comme selon Faustine Vincent du Monde, une partie des militaires malades auraient été transportés en bus au Republican Scientific and Practical Center for Radiation Medicine and Human Ecology, un centre spécialisé dans les irradiation et situé à Homiel, dans le Bélarus voisin. L'information aurait été confirmée par des médias locaux indépendants.
    Creuser des tranchées dans la Forêt Rousse, également appelée Forêt Rouge, n'était sans doute pas la plus brillante des idées. Les manœuvres effectuées en char dans la poussière encore radioactive de la Zone d'exclusion auraient également joué un rôle dans ces irradiations sévères.
    Quand il l'a su, le chef du Conseil de l'agence d'Etat ukrainienne pour la gestion de la zone d'exclusion, Oleksandr Syrota, avait alors écrit sur Facebook : "J'aimerais leur souhaiter du fond du cœur de creuser plus profondément, et de s'asseoir plus longtemps. Amen" #Tchernobyl
    — Faustine Vincent (@faustvincent) March 31, 2022
    Organisateur de visites dans la zone, un autre fin connaisseur des règles qu'elle impose, Yaroslav Yemelianenko, n'a pas été plus tendre envers ces manquements à peine croyables aux plus élémentaires des règles de sécurité à respecter dans un tel endroit.
    À lire aussiPourquoi la logistique de l'armée russe en Ukraine est si nulle
    «Un autre groupe de terroristes irradiés, qui ont occupé la zone de Tchernobyl, a été transporté au Radiation Medicine Center de Homiel aujourd'hui. Vous avez creusé des tranchées dans la Forêt Rousse, conn*ards? Vous allez devoir vivre avec ça pour le reste de votre courte vie», a-t-il ainsi écrit.
    Another batch of russian irradiated terrorists, who occupied the Chornobyl zone, was brought to the Belarusian Radiation Medicine Center in Homel today. Have you dug enough trenches in the Red Forest, motherf*ckers? Now live with it for the rest of your short life.
    — Yaroslav Yemelianenko (@ChornobylTour) March 30, 2022[/COLOR][/COLOR]
  11. j'attends d'autres sources mais elles existent sur le web
  12. Guerre en Ukraine : des soldats russes contaminés à Tchernobyl après avoir creusé des tranchées

    Les forces russes ont commencé à se retirer, jeudi 31 mars, du site nucléaire de Tchernobyl en Ukraine. Certains auraient été exposés après avoir creusé des tranchées dans une zone radioactive. L’Agence internationale de l’énergie atomique a ouvert une enquête.
    Une vue satellite de la centrale de Tchernobyl, le 10 mars 2022. | AFPAfficher le diaporama
    Ouest-France Philippe MATHÉ.Publié le 01/04/2022 à 10h42

    C’est loin d’être l’idée du siècle. Plusieurs jeunes soldats russes auraient été contaminés après avoir creusé des tranchées dans la Forêt Rouge, située aux alentours de la centrale nucléaire de Tchernobyl. C’est dans cette forêt, il y a 35 ans, que des morceaux de combustible sont tombés pendant les explosions de la centrale. C’est aussi là qu’ont été enfouis des déchets nucléaires, hautement radioactifs.

    Les manœuvres effectuées en char dans la poussière encore radioactive de la Zone d’exclusion auraient également joué un rôle dans ces irradiations sévères, rapporte The Guardian. Le journal britannique se base sur des déclarations de la compagnie d’électricité publique ukrainienne Energoatom.

    Suivez ici notre direct consacré à la guerre en Ukraine, ce vendredi 1er avril 2022
    Les troupes « avaient paniqué au premier signe de maladie » qui « s’est manifestée très rapidement » et ont commencé à se préparer à partir jeudi 31 mars. Selon la journaliste du Monde Faustine Vincent, sept bus médicaux transportant des soldats russes, qui s’étaient emparés du site de Tchernobyl au début de l’offensive, ont été amenés au Centre de médecine radiologique à Homel, en Biélorussie.

    Il semble, selon les propos d’un employé de la centrale de Tchernobyl rapporté par l’agence Reuters, que les jeunes soldats n’avaient jamais entendu parler de la catastrophe nucléaire de 1986.
    Des Ukrainiens sans pitié

    La réaction des autorités ukrainiennes à l’irradiation accidentelle des soldats russes a été sans pitié : « J’aimerais leur souhaiter du fond du cœur de creuser plus profondément, et de s’asseoir plus longtemps. Amen », a écrit sur Facebook Oleksandr Syrota, le chef du Conseil de l’agence d’État ukrainienne pour la gestion de la zone d’exclusion,
    Yaroslav Yemelianenko, également membre de cette agence, est encore plus lapidaire sur Twitter : « Un autre groupe de terroristes (sic) irradiés, qui ont occupé la zone de Tchernobyl, a été transporté au Radiation Medicine Center de Homiel aujourd’hui. Vous avez creusé des tranchées dans la Forêt Rouge, conn*rds ? Vous allez devoir vivre avec ça pour le reste de votre courte vie. »

    Une enquête ouverte par l’AIEA

    L’Agence internationale de l’énergie atomique (AIEA) a déclaré qu’elle ne pouvait pas confirmer les affirmations de la compagnie d’électricité publique ukrainienne Energoatom et cherchait une évaluation indépendante. Elle s’apprête à envoyer sa première « mission d’assistance et de soutien » à Tchernobyl dans les prochains jours.
    Invité de BFMTV, ce vendredi 1er avril, Petro Kotin, président de Energoatom, a confirmé des « traces inhabituelles de radiation » après le retrait des forces russes. Il a confirmé que des militaires avaient potentiellement pénétré dans la Forêt Rouge : « Nous savons que certaines personnes ont développé des symptômes liés à la radiation, mais nous ne pouvons pas le confirmer à 100 %. Ils construisaient des fortifications dans cette forêt, dans les endroits où les niveaux de radiation étaient très élevés. »

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