Press's Fascination with Deep Packet Inspection Flawed In support of echo's "bullshit" assertion: Repressive governments will do what they can to crack down on online dissent. By picking up on the WSJ's highly questionable "deep packed inspection" article, the author misses the real story: this is a measure/counter-measure/counter-counter-measure game. First, Nokia flatly denies the claims WSJ's article: "Nokia Siemens Networks has not provided any deep packet inspection, web censorship or Internet filtering capability to Iran." Second, even if Nokia is lying, anyone using the Onion Router (TOR) anonymous network is safe from DPI because all traffic between the client computer and TOR entry node is encrypted -- only TOR's exit node is unencrypted and would be able to sniff the packets (as has actually happened). If the "https" SSL protocol is used, then the entire message is encrypted end-to-end and no one but the destination has access to the message. Third, TOR traffic from Iran is skyrocketing, as discussed at length at Anonymous Iran. A Persian-language TOR recently appeared. And it's very easy to set up a proxy server to act as a bridge to TOR that will bypass government filtering. Others that have raised red flags about the WSJ's article: Iran, Traffic Analysis, and Deep Packet Inspection, Wikipedia: Deep packet inspection in Iran: "It’s at this point that we can say that Iran is either using DPI in incredibly complex and sophisticated ways that push the technology to its limits, or the WSJ is blowing smoke. ... I truly wonder just how accurate the story from the WSJ is on the technical capabilities of the DPI devices that are deployed" All these arguments, based on both the fact that the Iranians don't have the capabilities the WSJ attributes to it, and the fact that if it did, these capabilities are easily undermined by encryption, undermine many of the article's premises. The real question is how many and how quickly Iranians will adapt to using these more sophisticated tools.